Choosing the right set of communications standards is fundamental in any kind of interaction, especially in the coordination of economic activities. This decision problem, generally referred to as "the standardization problem", mainly results from interdependencies due to positive network effects. The problem has to be analyzed differently in centralized and decentralized networks. Therefore, we developed separate models for each of these coordination forms which illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of using standards. We based the economic parameters of the models and the discussion of its implications on empirical research. To gain information about the use of software standards in enterprises, we conducted a comprehensive empirical survey, both in Germany and North America.
INTRODUCTION
Every interaction and all coordination in economic processes is based upon communication. The exchange of information necessarily requires both the sender and receiver of a message to use a mutual language or set of communications standards. Communications standards can be generally defined as rules which provide the basis for interaction between actors (man, as well as machine). These rules must be known or determined ex ante, i.e. before communication begins. If n actors bilaterally agree to a set of communications standards, then n⋅(n-1)/2 rules must be defined. Such a Babylonian cacophony of languages rarely leads to an efficient exchange of information, however. The uniqueness of communications standards lies in their solely bilateral functionality; they work only when both the sender and the receiver of a message use identical or at least compatible standards. This basic principle for the use of communications standards applies to natural languages as well as to EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) for the electronic transfer of business documents or to network protocols like TCP/IP, for example. Thus, the decision to implement a standard is necessarily tied to the standardization decision of the communications partners. The user's benefit from a given standard generally increases with the number of other users. This phenomenon -the increase of utility derived from a good as the number of users increases -is known as a positive network effect, or demand-side economies of scale, in economic terms. See for example Katz & Shapiro (1985) or Farrell & Saloner (1988) . Network effects lead to the interdependence of decisions regarding communications standards by otherwise completely independent actors. This interdependence results in coordination problems because actors, such as firms, do not know in advance when which standards will be implemented by other firms, if at all.
Our research focuses on the examination of alternative forms of coordination and their impact on the selection of communications standards. We have developed two models for evaluating different coordination designs, differentiating between centralized and decentralized coordination of standardization decisions. These models can also be used to analyze and evaluate further cooperation forms between participants in communication networks. We based the economic parameters of the models and the discussion of their implications on empirical research. To gain information about the use of software standards in enterprises, we conducted a comprehensive empirical survey, both in Germany and North America. It focuses on the corporate adoption and use of various Information Technology (IT) standards, including Internet and electronic commerce standards, business software and EDI.
NETWORK EFFECTS AS THE MOTIVATION FOR

STANDARDIZATION
The network effects described above form the basis for an economic analysis of the use of standards. These effects describe the positive correlation between the diffusion of a standard and the benefits for its users. Katz & Shapiro (1985) differentiate between two levels of network effects. Direct network effects describe the direct physical effects which the number of users has upon the utility of a standard. For instance, using a particular EDI standard becomes more valuable the more business partners use the same standard. Indirect network effects arise from interdependencies in the consumption of complementary goods. Thus, widespread use of a standard can be expected to lead to an increased supply of complementary products. The software and consulting services surrounding a new technology like the Internet are one good example. Most studies approach standards as a diffusion of technological innovation, analyzing the circumstances which lead to the spread of different stan-dards. Such work focuses on compatibility. The use of compatible technologies allows any user to become a member of various communications networks, making possible the access to databases and software, the exchange of documents and data, and the simple act of direct communication. Compatibility -and thereby standardization -is then a question of cooperation which has strategic importance for competitiveness (Besen & Farrell, 1994, p. 117) . Because compatibility, or standardization, can only be observed in relation to other actors, markets in which compatibility is an important product characteristic are also inevitably markets with strong network effects.
Because network effects are realized by the consumer, the size of the network, and thereby the number of users or the total expected number of participants, is decisive in defining the utility of a standard. No customer wants to buy a technology which does not become the dominant standard, and risk either paying the cost of switching to a different standard or accepting the disadvantages of a small network.
Developing and influencing consumer expectations therefore takes on added significance, as expectations rather than the actual product quality or price can determine the decision to buy a specific technology. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy then, poorer technologies can beat out better ones to become the dominant standard, simply because of expectations (e.g. Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Katz & berger, 1983) . In contrast, Katz & Shapiro (1986) show than an overabundance, or excess momentum, can occur when producers with market power set very low prices for a standard at early stages, subsidizing early buyers and realizing higher returns from later consumers of the eventually more valuable technology. The existence of network effects can also cause the market to select the wrong number or wrong type of network goods. Because the size of the network or installed base determines the benefits of a standard, it is possible for an existing technology of poorer quality with a large, locked-in installed base to block the success of an innovative, technologically superior standard (e.g. Farrell & Saloner, 1988) . Coordination of decisions on the implementation of communications technology among all actors to ensure unified adoption of standards throughout the entire network would therefore seem to be desirable, as every actor thereby realizes the maximum benefits of the network (see Katz & Shapiro, 1986, p. 824) . The costs of coordination however, hinder such efforts. The existence of such costs in both the design and diffusion phases of a standard can generate a free-rider problem because there is a positive incentive to avoid the costs of development of and agreement on a given standard by implementing these results free of charge after their evolution. Another negative result of coordination costs is the start-up problem, in which all actors perceive an incentive to wait and see which standard prevails in order to avoid the risk of a premature and possibly unfavorable selection.
THE STANDARDIZATION PROBLEM: A BASIC MODEL
There are various benefits and costs to implementing standards. The common use of IT standards generally simplifies transactions carried out between actors or eases the exchange of information between them. While the use of IT standards can lead to direct savings resulting from decreased information costs due to cheaper and faster communication, standards often induce more strategic benefits and allow the realization of further savings potential. In short, avoiding media discontinuities eliminates errors and costs. The case of 3Com described later will show how significant the potential savings in this particular area can be. The immediate availability of data allows an automation and coordination of different business processes, e. g. enabling just in time production. As a result, an enterprise can reduce its stocks drastically, capital investment in stocks decreases, it can faster react to changes in its competitive environment. In addition, standardization can enhance the exchange of information so that more and better information can be exchanged between communications partners. Because information provides the foundation for any decision, better information implies better decisions. Economically, this is represented as an increase in the information value. As we will later empirically substantiate, the implementation of an IT standard, on the other hand, is accompanied by the costs of hardware, software, switching, and introduction or training -in short, standardization costs. Furthermore, the interdependence between individual decisions to standardize occasioned by network externalities can yield coordination costs of agreeing with market partners on a single standard. More generally, coordination costs embody the costs of developing and implementing a network-wide communications base comprised of a specific constellation of standards which considers the individual, heterogeneous interests of all actors. Concretely, these include costs for time, personnel, data gathering and processing, and control and incentive systems. Depending upon the context, these standardization costs can vary widely .
As shown, the fundamental significance of standards lies in their indispensability in the exchange of information. Communication between various actors can be visually described as a network. A communications network is a directed graph without isolated nodes. The nodes represent the communications partners (i) (e.g. human, machine, firm), characterized by their ability to process, save and transfer information. The network edges represent the communications relationships. In our models the nodes of a network represent the costs of standardization (K i ) for the respective network actors i while the edges show the costs of their communications relations (c ij ) with their respective partners. These costs include the above mentioned costs of information exchange, as well as opportunity costs of sub-optimal decisions. Because information provides the foundation for decisions in all areas of the firm, better information implies better decisions. From an economic perspective, this can be seen as an increase in the value of information (see Laux, 1995, p. 289-310) . Cost reductions can be realized only when both communicating nodes i and j have introduced the same or a compatible standard. This does not mean that no costs whatsoever occur to transfer information when both nodes are standardized. Rather, the c ij can be interpreted as the difference between the information costs before ( . Thus, the decision problem arises which nodes should be equipped with which IT standard. In our model, there is a tradeoff between the node-related costs of implementing a standard and the edge-related savings of information costs. The benefits of implementing a communications standard must be determined for each node i. In order to do so, the costs of standardization (i.e. node costs K i ) must be compared to the savings c ij to be realized along the edges. If the savings are greater than the costs, then the standard will be implemented. The savings of the edge cost c ij can only then be realized however, if the partner node j also implements this same standard, while the node costs K i occur independently from the decision of the partner node.
In the case described by figure 1, nodes 1 and 2 have information costs c 12 and c 21 , respectively. If node 1 or 2 standardizes, it pays the respective standardization costs K 1 or K 2 .
Figure 1. Costs of nodes and edges
If both nodes implement the same standard, they save c 12 and c 21 , respectively.
If these standards are not compatible however, nodes 1 and 2 pay the costs K 1 +c 12
and K 2 +c 21 , respectively. In this simplified situation with two actors, coordination of the decision leads to a total benefit of (c 12 +c 21 ) -(K 1 +K 2 ) and prevents the firms 
Centralized Coordination
In order to approach the centralized decision problem, we introduce a binary in- 
s.t.:
Equation (1) describes the costs of a standardization decision. For x i =1 and x j =1, restriction (2) in combination with the objective function (1) requires that y ij =0. Our model for solving the centralized standardization problem can calculate the optimal allocation of standards to all actors in any given communications network (first-best solution).
Centralized coordination ensures that a first-best solution is achieved, as all relevant data are considered in the calculation and the means of enforcing implementation of these results exist.
However, in real life application the central manager might encounter significant coordination problems. The coordination costs described above result from the following problems: § Data problem: Given the realistic assumption of asymmetric information distribution and opportunistic behavior on the part of actors, it is questionable that accurate and complete information can be retrieved from all nodes within the network at acceptable costs considering that the nodes' reporting induces resource allocation. § Complexity problem: The centralized standardization problem is an np-complete problem and therefore particularly difficult to solve. Even solutions to simple centralized coordination problems are difficult because of their integer structure. § Implementation problem: A centralized coordination system is no guarantee that a given, preordained solution will be implemented by all actors. Limits on authority exist even within a hierarchy. The existence of agreements and contracts does not automatically ensure their acceptance. Systems of control and incentives for bridging this problem also involve costs.
The centralized coordination problem is a combinatorial and therefore particularly complex optimization problem. The integer restriction is a result of the binary nature of the standardization problem: yes/no. Integer programming, however, offers a perfect answer to the problem of interdependencies caused by network effects through its enumerative solution structure.
Decentralized Coordination
The model described above for solving a centralized standardization problem implicitly assumes that the data, complexity, and implementation problems are resolved (without costs) and that a central manager exists, who can calculate and implement an optimal result network-wide. Given autonomous actors and a realistic knowledge of the data, however, the decentralized standardization problem is foremost a problem of anticipating the standardization decisions of others. Every node i must predict the behavior of all other nodes j (j=1,...,n; i≠j). This prediction provides the basis for the decentralized standardization problem. Modeling the decision problem, it is assumed that all nodes i know the various standardization costs occurring in every other node j. This assumption is not particularly restrictive, as these costs can be expected to be similar or at least easily estimated, even for dissimilar firms. It is further assumed that all nodes i know the costs along the edges which directly affect them, i.e. the information costs c ij which they themselves pay and the . However, node i does not know the strategies pursued by nodes j ex ante, and vice versa. We assume that the actors are risk neutral decision makers. The expected utility of standardization can then be calculated as
where p ij describes the probability with which actor i believes that node j will standardize. If E[U(i)] > 0 then actor i will standardize. If actor i were certain of the behavior of his communications partners, p ij would take on a value of 0 or 1. The decentralized model, however, implies uncertainty. Given our assumptions about the availability of data, p ij can be heuristically computed as follows. Every edge <ij> with costs c ij contributes to the amortization of the standardization costs of the incidental node i. Because the standardization costs K j and the information costs c ji are the only costs regarding j known to node i, actor i can assume that the edge <ji> is representative for all of j's edges. Combining all assumed data, node i can then develop the following probability estimate p ij for the probability of standardization in node j by attempting to imitate j's decision making behavior:
The numerator describes the net savings possible through the standardization for node j, assuming that all nodes standardize and that the edge <ji> is representative of all of node j's communications relationships (best case). The denominator normalizes the fraction for non-negative K j as a value from 0 to 1. Should the fraction have a value less than 0, that is c ji (n-1) < K j , then p ij = 0 holds. This suggests the follow-
As long as the individual actors are unable to influence the standardization decisions of their communications partners, they can do no more ex ante than estimate the probability that their partners will standardize. Ex post of course, the communications costs either remain or are no longer applicable, but the situation of uncertainty described here results from the assumption of limited knowledge of available data. The decentralized model allows the prediction of standardization behavior in a network, thereby creating a basis for predicting the effects of various concepts of coordination. Such measures for influencing the decision to introduce standards also generally apply to influencing the development of expectations regarding the future spread of standards (installed base) or to forms of cooperation which would allow partners to jointly reap the profits of standardization through partial internalization of network effects.
CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED COORDINATION
The standardization behavior found in a decentralized network under the above outlined assumptions can be modeled through numerical simulations. Relevant costs were randomly generated for a network of twenty nodes and used to calculate results for function (5). In the simulation, information costs are varied and assumed to be normally distributed with a standard deviation of σ=200; standardization costs are also normally distributed with µ=10,000 and σ=1,000. 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500  550  600  650  700  750  800  850  900  950  1000  1050  1100  1150  1200  1250  1300  1350  1400  1450  1500  1550  1600  1650 The models also provide a good starting point for further analysis towards the question of how incentive systems or local cooperation within networks will improve the quality of decisions. These improvements manifest themselves in the realization of greater potential savings caused by "correct" decisions to standardize or the reduction or prevention of "wrong" decisions on standardization. For example, every actor could calculate the individual maximum possible benefits resulting from standardization as the difference between the costs of standardization and the costs along all incidental edges. The actor could use a portion of the positive difference over his current (ex ante) expected value to pay premiums to other nodes to ensure that they implement a standard. In the same way, large firms or firms with high edge-related costs c ij could give away options to their partners which hedge the loss in the case of an incorrect decision. Risk averse actors may also be prepared to pay a hefty sum for such options. The existence of intermediaries in networks offers yet another alternative in the form of outsourcing. An actor who implements multiple standards can also offer such services, thereby reducing its own costs. For a comprehensive model see Westarp, Weber, Buxmann, & König (1997) .
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Examining questions of managing IT standards in enterprises we conducted a survey in the summer of 1998. A questionnaire containing about 30 questions on 8 pages was sent to 1,000 of the largest companies both in Germany and the United
States (see for an online-version of the questionnaire http://caladan.wiwi.unifrankfurt.de/IWI/projectb3/eng/survey). Prior to mailing the questionnaire, each company was contacted by telephone to identify the head of the MIS department to whom the questionnaire was then directly addressed. 250 completed questionnaires were returned in Germany (25%), and 102 in the US (10.2%). The goal of this study was to gain empirical data about corporate adoption and use of various IT standards.
On the one hand, the study was designed to provide an insight into the determinants of strategic standardization issues like the diversity of software solutions, compatibility problems, and the centralization of decision structure. On the other hand, more detailed questions, e.g. about benefits and costs, were asked for the selected categories Internet and electronic commerce standards, business software and EDI. To evaluate our standardization models, we will first empirically analyze costs and benefits of standardization decisions in business networks using EDI as an example.
In a second step, we will evaluate the standardization problem in enterprises and examine the question of centralization vs. decentralization of decisions.
Standardization in Business Networks: The EDI Example
To enable efficient communication within business networks, the participants often face the decision problem to agree on certain EDI standards. The results of our empirical study show that about 52% of the responding enterprises in Germany and about 75% in the US use EDI technology to transfer structured business data. In av-erage, German enterprises use EDI with 21% of their business partners, while it is 30% in the US.
Enterprises that want to use EDI have to choose from a variety of different standards to structure the content of the documents. The respondents were asked which particular standards are in use in their companies. Figure 3 To evaluate the parameters of our models we also asked the participants using EDI about the costs and savings of implementing and using an EDI solution. Analyzing the data we found that there was great heterogeneity in terms of realized costs and savings since the context of using EDI varies extremely between different companies (see ). We will therefore illustrate empirical figures of costs and savings by studying the case of 3Com (see for a more detailed version of the case study .
With over $6 billion in annual revenues, 3Com is one of the largest players in EDI. This explains the fact that already about 50 per cent of the company's suppliers are EDI capable. With EDI becoming more and more a significant strategic issue for enterprises, especially in the computer industry, 3Com tries to convince more of its business partners to use EDI; for new suppliers and distributors it is a requirement already. Focusing on the costs of implementation four areas can be separated.
• The start up costs for the EDI solution were less than $25,000 (including the first year of VAN service) since already existing technical and human resources were used.
• With the growing data traffic new EDI project implementation took place. Establishing the EDI Operations department, new personnel was hired. Also, the technical infrastructure was upgraded, installing a new Unix translator for $100,000.
• The setup of a new trading partner for EDI at 3Com takes about 2-3 days of a programmer's work.
• A new transaction setup like adding a certain document to the existing set of an EDI partnership takes a programmer about 8 working days (which is rather low compared to an industry average of about 2 weeks), and the mapping takes about $1,140.
The annual costs of running the solution are estimated at $350,000 for personnel, $36,000 for the data transmission (VAN services), and about $17,000 for addi-tional external services, such as software license agreements and outside contracting consultants. 3Com also uses a significant portion of the budget for continuing education and professional conferences.
Compared to the benefits, the costs of the EDI solution seem to be rather reasonable. At 3Com the costs of manually processing an order process are calculated at $38 compared to $1.35 using EDI. This sums up to estimated savings of $750,000
in sales order and invoice processing. Taking also the reduction of data entry errors, efficiency increases due to better warehouse management, and reduction of processing delays into account, the EDI Operations department estimates overall savings of $1.3 million. These figures are expected to increase dramatically next year since 3Com is in the middle of consolidations due to the merger with U.S. Robotics. At the moment the EDI systems of the two companies are in the process of integration.
Heterogeneity, Compatibility Problems and the Question of Centralization
After empirically examining the costs and savings parameters of our models, we will now evaluate the standardization problem within enterprises by analyzing how heterogeneous software solutions currently are and to what extent compatibility problems arise. We will also examine the question whether centralization of decisions might help to solve such problems.
To gain information about the heterogeneity of software solutions in companies the respondents were asked about the number of different products they have currently in use in the different categories. Looking at the variety of standards used does not necessarily provide enough information about related problems. Therefore, the respondents were asked to give their evaluation concerning the incompatibility problems within the software categories classified above. A five category Likert scale was used for this question with the extremes "very significant" and "very insignificant". Figure 6 illustrates how often the categories "very significant" and "significant" were chosen. For reasons of simplification, the figure does not show the answers in the other categories.
In general, enterprises in the United States seem to be more likely to experience problems of incompatibility than in Germany. The largest differences appear in the categories of "Business software", "E-mail programs" and "Programming languages". MIS managers of both countries report their largest problems of incompatibility in the area of "Business software". This is likely to be a result of the strategic importance of such systems in enterprises. Nowadays, business software has an impact on all key processes. Therefore, incompatibilities in this area lead to more significant problems than in other areas. In general, we find that incompatibilities are an important matter in today's enterprises and therefore, that the standardization problem we described in our models is of practical relevance.
We assume that the chance of incompatibility problems increases with the number of different products in use. To test this hypothesis we measured the correlation between these two variables. We have to consider that the variable that measures the number of different standards is an interval variable while the incompatibility problems were measured ordinally. In this case, it is appropriate to apply statistical tests 
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for the ordinal level. Therefore, the interval variable was transferred to an ordinal scale. To do this, the six categories "1 product in use", "2 products in use", "3 products in use", "4 products in use", "5 products in use" and "more than 5 products in use" were created. We then calculated the Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma and the Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient (rho). Both of them are applicable to measure the correlation of ordinal variables (Levin & Fox, 1997) . In our case the Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma is a particularly appropriate measure of correlation since the variables involved are ranked in categories (Levin & Fox, 1997, p. 331 In most of the cases we see a moderate positive correlation between the two variables. For the German data sample in every software category all levels of significance for both coefficients are better than 0.0005 (SPSS shows the value .000).
This means that we can be sure with a confidence of more than 99.95 percent that the measured correlation is not a result of sampling error.
The empty spaces in the table indicate the areas in which α is larger than 0.05 and therefore correlations are not significant. This applies for the categories "Network protocols", "Programming languages" and "Operation systems" in the US sample. One reason for this might be that this sample is smaller than the German one. However, in general we find a positive correlation between the problem of incompatibility and the number of different software standards used.
There is a particularly strong correlation in the category of "Business software".
Taking into consideration that the MIS managers also reported this category as the one with the largest problem of incompatibility, it seems reasonable to reduce potential incompatibilities by reducing the number of different products used in the company. We will use the example of business software to further analyze if centralization can reduce the number of different products in use and therefore reduce incompatibility problems. We propose the hypothesis that centralization leads to more homogeneous software solutions. In order to test this hypothesis for the field of business software, we measured the potential correlations between centralization of decision making and number of different products used for the data samples of both countries.
The respondents were asked to answer the question who makes the decision in the field of business software. To answer this question the respondents could choose Multiple answers were possible. For analysis and interpretation the data was regrouped. Answers of category 1 and 2 were classified as "central", 3 and 4 as "decentral". Whenever answers were found in both of these groups, they were newly classified as "team". Answers were also counted by the variable "team", whenever it was explicitly mentioned in the category "others" that decisions were made with central and decentral units participating. In most of the cases we find that decisions concerning the selection of business software are made within teams, i.e. both central IT departments and decentralized departments are involved in the decision process. An interesting result, however, is that in Germany decision-making is currently more often centrally organized.
It appears to be promising to take a closer look at a potential connection between the larger degree of centralization (see table 2) and the smaller heterogeneity (see figure 5 ) in Germany in comparison to the United States. In accordance with the results of our numerical simulation centralization seems to lead to more homogenous solutions. This correlation appears to be reasonable since a central decision making unit is able to consider company-wide network effects related to the use of software standards.
Based on our findings, we will try to validate this hypothesis empirically using business software as an example. In order to do this, we measured the potential correlation between centralization of decision making and number of different products used (the latter as an indicator for the degree of standardization) for the data samples of both countries. To measure potential correlation between the two variables we calculated the Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma and the Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient (rho) . Table 3 . The correlation between the degree of centralization and the number of di fferent products used.
While for the German sample no significant correlation was found, testing the US sample shows a moderate, statistically significant, and negative correlation between the number of different products in use and the degree of centralization.
Therefore, we accept the research hypothesis for the US sample: The number of different business software used in enterprises decreases when the degree of centralization increases.
This result seems to substantiate the findings of the simulation in section 4 that centralization leads to more standardization and therefore to less problems of incompatibility. Nevertheless, the measured correlation needs further examination since it could statistically only be proven in the comparatively small US sample.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Centralized coordination of standardization decisions best describes the situation within a firm or a combine. We introduced a model for solving the centralized standardization problem, which can calculate the optimal assignment of standards to actors in any given communications network. The decentralized model we introduce describes the standardization behavior of independent actors given limited knowledge of relevant data and a lack of hierarchical authority. Numerical simulations show that, in general, a higher degree of standardization is expected in centrally coordinated networks. The failure to realize collective savings potential follows in lockstep. These analytical findings are backed by our empirical data.
Using EDI as an example, we gave an overview of the current structure of costs and benefits of implementing IT-standards in large companies. We showed that the data needed for the evaluation of different coordination mechanisms by our models can be collected empirically. We also evaluated the significance of the standardization problem in large enterprises. We gained data about the status quo of IT standards used (number of different products in use in different categories) and proved statistically that with an increasing number of products the problem of incompatibility is also increasing. This indicates the lack of compatibility and appropriate interfaces among current software products, which leads to the standardization problem we analyze in our framework. For the US sample we were able to prove the positive correlation between centralization and standardization that was already shown by the simulation results.
Using our framework as a starting point, we will conduct further research towards coordination costs and incentive mechanisms in the context of standardization. Furthermore, we will implement the models in cooperation with a large German enterprise as a controlling instrument for standardization decisions. Additionally, we will use relational diffusion models to examine the decentralized coordination of consumers in software markets.
